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PERUVIAN TAX REFORM: 
INCREASING GOVERNMENT 
REVENUES AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
Kathryn E. Bahner
Introduction
 Economic growth is necessary for any 
country to prosper. This growth stems from 
an economy becoming increasingly adept at 
producing goods and providing services, and 
it can be nominally measured through GDP. 
Over the past decade Peru has experienced a 
considerable increase in GDP, approximately 6 
percent growth per year; however, the economy 
still has considerable room to grow (Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, 2016). The United 
Nations currently classifies countries into 
three categories based on a country’s economic 
situation (United Nations Statistics Division). 
The categories are developing economies, 
economies in transition, and developed 
economies. Peru is currently considered a 
developing economy, which means that it is 
in the category of countries that are the least 
developed (United Nations Statistics Division). 
The Peruvian government needs to focus 
on increasing GDP growth to advance Peru 
from a developing economy to an economy in 
transition.
 For the Peruvian economy to continue 
to grow, the government must raise more 
revenue for its underfunded sectors. In Peru, 
there are currently many sectors that are in 
direct need of additional funding: education, 
water and sanitation, healthcare, housing, and 
environmental protection. Providing additional 
funding to these sectors will improve the lives 
of the Peruvian people, allowing the country as 
a whole to become more productive. Because 
the government is not generating sufficient 
revenues to fund these sectors, not only is there 
a stunt in productivity growth but also gaps in 
social equality (defined as equal opportunities 
for all Peruvians, such as in education and 
healthcare) as well as in income and wealth 
equality. 
 There are three major ways in which 
the Peruvian government currently funds 
its operations: taxation, issuing public debt, 
and foreign direct investment. Generating 
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higher revenues through taxation is more 
advantageous than issuing public debt because 
debt must eventually be paid off with additional 
interest. Furthermore, the funds used to pay 
off this debt will come from taxation revenues; 
therefore, a reformation of the tax system must 
come first. 
 In this article, I provide an overview of the 
current tax system in Peru. Then I analyze the 
effectiveness of the tax system and how the tax 
system affects social equality. Finally, I address 
the proposed legislation regarding tax reform 
and include my assessment of the proposal.
Overview of Government Revenues
 The Peruvian government generates most 
of its revenues through taxation. In 2016 the 
projected overall government revenues for Peru 
were 124.2 billion soles (S/.) ($38.1 billion).1 
Taxation revenues make up 76 percent of 
government revenues. For 2016, the projected 
amount of taxation revenues was S/.94.6 billion 
($29 billion). The Superintendencia Nacional 
de Administración Tributaria (SUNAT) is the 
government administrative body responsible 
for collecting national taxes. There are four 
taxes that make up 89 percent of the taxation 
revenues collected by SUNAT. These taxes are 
the income tax (both corporate and personal), 
the import tax, the value-added tax (VAT), and 
the excise tax. Figure 1 shows the projected 
distribution of taxation revenues for 2016. 
 As seen in Figure 1, the VAT generates the 
largest amount of taxation revenue, comprising 
48 percent of total taxation revenues. The 
Peruvian government projected that in 2016 
the VAT would generate S/.53.3 billion ($16.4 
billion) of taxation revenue. The income 
tax, from both individuals and corporations, 
is projected to generate the second largest 
amount of taxation revenue (S/.37.6 billion 
[$11.5 billion]), which would be 34 percent of 
total taxation revenues. The import tax and the 
excise tax are projected to generate a smaller 
amount of revenues, with projected amounts 
of S/.1.68 billion ($520 million) and S/.5.97 
billion ($1.83 million), respectively. These 
four taxes are imposed on Peruvians at the 
national level. There are also municipal taxes 
 1Assuming an exchange rate of S/.1 = $0.31.
imposed on Peruvians based on an individual’s 
or household’s residence as well as a municipal 
property tax and a municipal vehicle tax 
(Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2013). This 
article focuses on taxes at the national level.
 Non-tax revenues make up 24 percent of 
government revenues. Non-tax revenues are 
revenues the government receives that are not 
generated through taxation. Most of the non-tax 
revenues received by the Peruvian government 
come from social contributions, income from 
Peruvian government offices, and royalties 
from oil, gas, and mining. Social contributions 
are social security payments from employees 
and employers; they represent the largest 
amount of non-tax revenues, amounting to 
S/.12.7 billion ($3.9 billion) (Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru). Social security revenues are 
considered non-tax revenues because the 
money collected goes directly to a fund that 
is only used for social security purposes. That 
is, the government cannot access or use the 
funds for any other expenditure. Income from 
government offices consists of penalties and 
fines, licensing fees, and proceeds from the 
sale of government assets. From January to 
November of 2016, non-tax revenues totaled 
S/.22.9 billion ($7 billion). 
Overview of Taxation Revenues 
Income Tax
 Both individuals and corporations are 
required to pay income tax in Peru. There are 
six categories of income subject to personal 
income tax. These categories are earned 
income (income earned from working for an 
employer); income from self-employment; 
trade or business partnership income; 
dividends; interest; and rental income (“Peru - 
Income Tax”). The personal income tax is based 
on “tax units” created each year by SUNAT. 
The tax units are restructured each year by 
SUNAT to account for certain factors, such as 
inflation. For example, in 2011, one tax unit 
was equivalent to  S/.3,600 ($1,098), whereas 
in 2015 one tax unit was equivalent to S/.3,850 
($1,174) (“Peru: Thinking beyond Borders”). 
The personal income tax is a progressive tax. 
 The number of tax units assigned to each 
household or individual is determined by the 
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taxable income earned by the household or 
individual. There are currently five tax brackets 
that Peruvian citizens are subject to based 
on their number of tax units; the applicable 
tax rates range from 8 percent to 30 percent. 
Non-Peruvian residents who earn income in 
Peru are subject to a flat 30 percent tax rate 
on taxable income. Table 1 shows the current 
distribution of Peruvian tax brackets created 
by SUNAT along with the applicable income tax 
rates.
 In addition to individuals and households, 
an income tax is imposed on corporations. The 
corporate income tax is structured as a flat 
tax, which means that the tax rate is the same 
for all corporations. Corporations can deduct 
all expenses that are related to the generation 
of the corporation’s earnings. Gross income 
less these deductions is subject to a corporate 
income tax of 28 percent (De La Vega). 
Investment Income  
and Capital Gains Tax
 Investment income includes dividend 
income, interest income, and rental income. 
Investment income and capital gains are subject 
to different tax rates than earned income. The 
tax rate applied to dividend income is a flat rate 
Table 1
Distribution of Peruvian Tax Brackets
Taxable Income Applicable 
Tax Units
Applicable 
Tax Rate 
(%)
Marginal Increase 
in Tax Rate 
(%)
<$6,459 1–5 8 N/A
$6,459–$25,838 5–20 14 6 
$25,838–$45,218 20–35 17 3 
$45,218–$58,138 35–45 20 3 
>$58,138 >45 30 10 
Source: “Peru: Thinking beyond Borders.”
Figure 1
Projected Sources of Taxation Revenues in Peru in 2016
Import tax, 2%
Excise tax, 5%
Other
11%
Value-added tax
48%
Income tax
34%
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2013.
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based on whether the dividends were earned 
from a Peruvian source or a foreign source. 
Dividends earned from a Peruvian source 
are subject to a 4.1 percent tax rate, whereas 
dividends earned from a foreign source are 
subject to a 30 percent tax rate (“Peru - Income 
Tax”). Interest earned by corporations is subject 
to a 4.99 percent tax rate, whereas interest 
earned by individuals and small to medium-
sized businesses is tax exempt (“Tax Guide: 
Peru 2014,” p. 12). Owners of rental property 
are subject to a tax imposed on rental income. 
The tax rate on rental income ranges from 6.00 
percent to 6.25 percent based on the value of 
the property and the amount of rental income 
that is received. Capital gains that are less than 
or equal to the equivalent of five tax units are 
exempt from taxation. Any capital gains that 
are over the equivalent of five tax units are 
subject to regular income tax (“Peru - Income 
Tax”).
Import Tax and Excise Tax
 Both the import tax and the excise tax 
are indirect taxes. An indirect tax is a tax that 
is collected by an individual or organization 
other than the Peruvian government; the 
individual or organization then transfers the 
collected tax to the Peruvian government. 
There is currently a tax on all imports, which 
ranges from 0 percent to 15 percent based on 
the type of goods being imported. Imports are 
also subject to the VAT (De La Vega).
 The excise tax is applied to specific goods 
with the intention to limit or lower their 
consumption. This indirect tax applies to such 
items as fuel, alcohol, cigarettes, and soft 
drinks. It is applied to either the import or the 
sale of these goods. Moreover, in contrast to the 
personal income tax, this type of tax typically 
is considered regressive because people with 
different income levels pay the same tax rate. 
The amount of excise tax imposed is based 
on an amount specific to the good, or on an 
ad valorem basis2 (“2016 Asia Pacific Indirect 
Tax Country Guide”). Regarding taxation, an ad 
valorem basis is the levying of a tax on an item 
at a flat rate; thus, the applicable amount of tax 
is proportional to the value of the good. 
 2Ad valorem is Latin for “according to value.”
Value-added Tax
 The last major tax imposed on Peruvians 
is the VAT. Like the import and excise taxes, 
the VAT is an indirect tax. The VAT is imposed 
on specific goods and services each time 
value is added throughout the supply chain. 
Therefore, a single product has the potential 
to be taxed multiple times. The VAT in Peru 
is currently 16 percent; however, the VAT is 
always accompanied by a 2 percent municipal 
promotion tax. Thus, these two taxes, applied 
together, are levied at a total rate of 18 percent 
(“2016 Asia Pacific Indirect Tax Country 
Guide”). The VAT is imposed on five types of 
transactions: the sale of goods within Peruvian 
territory; services performed or used in Peru; 
construction contracts executed in Peru; real 
property sales made by the contractors; and the 
importation of goods (“Tax Guide: Peru 2014”). 
The VAT is considered a regressive tax. It is not 
applied to the export of goods. 
Mining Royalties  
and the Special Mining Tax
 In addition to the taxes discussed 
previously, mining companies are required to 
pay both mining royalties and a “special mining 
tax” to the Peruvian government. In 2011, 
President Ollanta Humala revised the method 
formerly used to determine mining royalties 
and created the special mining tax. These 
reforms resulted in an increase in government 
revenues of nearly $1.1 billion per year. The 
amount of the special mining tax levied 
against a mining corporation is computed 
on a quarterly basis based on a corporation’s 
operating gross margin. The special mining tax 
is deductible for corporate income tax purposes 
and is levied at a range between 2 percent and 
8.4 percent of operating income (“Tax Guide: 
Peru 2014”).
 Royalty payments are payments made 
by a licensee to a licensor while the licensee 
is using the licensor’s asset or assets. The 
Peruvian government receives mining royalties 
when the government leases land to companies 
who perform mining operations on that land 
(Otto et al.). Prior to the 2011 revision, mining 
royalties were levied on sales at a rate ranging 
from 1 percent to 3 percent. After President 
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Humala’s reform, mining companies now 
pay royalties based on their operating profits 
rather than sales and at a rate that ranges from 
1 percent to 12 percent (Pantigoso et al.).
Effects of Tax Evasion 
Income Tax Evasion
 A major problem with the current tax 
system in Peru is tax evasion. This is due 
primarily to the large informal sector in 
Peru. The informal sector is defined as the 
percentage of Peruvians who are not registered 
with the government for employment 
purposes. Approximately 75 percent of all 
people living in Peru are part of the informal 
sector and do not pay income tax. The Peruvian 
government estimates that more than 50 
percent of income tax that should be reported 
is evaded (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
2013, p. 18). In 2016, the government was 
projected to collect S/.37.6 billion ($11.53 
billion) in income tax. If all Peruvians were 
included in the formal sector and no income 
taxes were evaded, the government, in theory, 
could collect approximately S/.75.2 billion 
($23 billion) more in income tax. Although 
eliminating the informal sector could increase 
taxation revenues by billions of soles, there is 
no quick solution to overcoming the problem 
of not registering for employment. The 
government is currently making efforts to 
decrease the size of the informal sector and is 
considering implementing repercussions for 
non-compliance.
 On December 31, 2014, the Peruvian 
Congress passed a law revising the tax bracket 
criteria for the personal income tax. The new 
income tax structure retained the five brackets 
but changed the tax rate for the lowest bracket 
from 15 percent to 8 percent (“Peru: Thinking 
beyond Borders”). Congress made this revision 
as an attempt to decrease the size of the informal 
sector. The thinking behind this revision was 
that decreasing the tax rate of the lowest tax 
bracket from 15 percent to 8 percent would 
entice Peruvians in the informal sector to join 
the formal sector and start paying income tax. 
However, this effort to reduce the size of the 
informal sector was not successful. One reason 
for this is that Peruvians in the informal sector 
currently do not pay income tax at all; so even 
though their applicable tax rate was lowered, 
they still did not have the motivation to begin 
paying income taxes. Thus, the issue of non-
compliance with employment registration 
persists.
Value-added Tax Evasion
 VAT evasion has been an ongoing issue 
in Peru. There is no designated registry for 
businesses to register for the VAT; rather, 
businesses have an obligation to register 
with SUNAT in order to receive their taxpayer 
identification number (“2016 Asia Pacific 
Indirect Tax Country Guide”). The two primary 
ways that businesses evade the VAT are by 
failing to register with SUNAT or by failing 
to report and pay the proper amount of VAT 
after registering with SUNAT. Approximately 
35 percent of VAT is evaded. While SUNAT 
encourages businesses to register to pay the 
VAT, there is no registry designated specifically 
for the administration of the VAT (“Peru: 
Thinking beyond Borders”). The Ministry 
of Economy and Finance anticipates that 
legislation will be enacted to further clarify the 
application of the VAT, which will then aid in 
the proper application and collection of the tax 
(Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2013). 
Presidential Tax Reform
 On April 10, 2016, Pedro Pablo 
Kuczynski was elected President of Peru as a 
representative of the Peruvians for Change 
party. As his party’s name suggests, Kuczynski 
has proposed numerous changes, among them 
revisions to the taxation system. Kuczynski’s 
reforms include lowering the VAT from 18 
percent to 17 percent and raising the corporate 
income tax rate from 28 percent to 30 percent. 
These changes are based on the premise that, 
in general, corporations pay their corporate 
income tax. Given minimal tax evasion in the 
corporate sector, a 2-percentage-point increase 
in the corporate tax rate will directly increase 
revenue. Because there is significantly more 
evasion with the VAT, Kuczynski believes that 
lowering the VAT could encourage more people 
to register and pay this tax (Post). 
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Comparison of Peruvian Tax System 
with that of Chile
 Peru’s neighbor, Chile, implemented 
a successful tax reform in the 1990s that 
strengthened both socioeconomic equality and 
government revenues. The overarching goal of 
Chile’s tax reform was to increase government 
revenues by $580 million per year for the years 
1991 through 1993 (Boylan). The Chilean tax 
reform was successful for two main reasons: 
the reform was extremely moderate in nature, 
and the changes were fully disclosed to the 
public (Boylan). Chile’s President, Patricio 
Aylwin, and the Chilean Congress enacted four 
tax reform laws in 1990. The reforms consisted 
of the following: an increase in the corporate 
income tax; a restructuring of tax brackets; a 
shift from the system of taxing estimated profits 
to actual profits for the highest contributors in 
the agriculture, transportation, and mining 
sectors; and, lastly, an increase in the VAT 
(Boylan). 
 There are both ideological similarities and 
differences between the Chilean tax reform in 
the 1990s and Peruvian President Kuczynski’s 
proposed tax reform. Both countries 
determined that changes needed to be made in 
the VAT and the corporate income tax. However, 
Peru and Chile have taken different approaches 
to tax reform. Kuczynski proposes to lower the 
VAT from 18 percent to 17 percent, whereas the 
Chilean government increased the VAT from 16 
percent to 18 percent (Boylan). Furthermore, 
the Chilean increase in the corporate income 
tax was more aggressive, with an increase from 
10 percent to 15 percent, whereas Kuczyinski 
proposed a slight increase from 28 percent to 
30 percent. Overall, Chile was more aggressive 
in demanding more taxes from corporations.
Socioeconomic Structure of Peru
 The structure of a taxation system is a 
major determinant of the wealth gap within a 
country. Each year, the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance breaks down the socioeconomic 
structure of Peru and separates households 
into five socioeconomic classes. The classes 
range from class A to class E. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of the socioeconomic classes 
of Peru, how the distribution has changed from 
2004 to 2014, and what analysts project it to be 
in 2021.
 Class A is the highest, or upper, class; 
the middle class is a combination of class B, 
the consolidated middle class, and class C, the 
emerging middle class; class D is the emerging 
lower class; and class E is the lower-class 
poor. In 2004 class E consisted of 27 percent 
of households, and the middle class, classes B 
and C, consisted of 29 percent of households. 
In 2014, the size of class E decreased to include 
18 percent of households, and classes B and C 
increased to include 44 percent of households 
(Ministry of Economic and Finance, 2016). The 
middle classes are increasing, while the lowest 
class is decreasing; therefore, the wealth gap is 
shrinking. I believe that the government must 
take further action to assist the movement of 
households from the lower classes to the middle 
classes. The government has the ability to do so 
by focusing on personal income tax reform. 
Tax System Structural Ideologies and 
Their Effect on Social Equality
 Tax systems may be structured in a 
liberal, moderate, or conservative manner. 
Liberal tax systems generally impose higher 
taxes. Furthermore, liberal tax systems impose 
proportionally higher tax rates on the wealthy 
while imposing lower tax rates on the less 
wealthy. More liberally structured tax systems 
not only increase government revenues but also 
increase social equality. The wealth gap slightly 
decreases when wealthier households are taxed 
at a higher rate than poorer households. This 
leads to greater social justice. A more liberal 
tax system is needed not only to raise taxation 
revenues but also to close the wealth gap and 
to attempt to provide equal opportunity for all 
citizens, especially those who are less fortunate. 
This is particularly true for a developing nation. 
 Proponents of a conservative tax system 
believe the government should receive 
lower revenues in general and that wealthier 
households should not be taxed at a rate that is 
significantly higher than the rate for the lower 
classes. There are cases in developed economies 
where a more conservative tax system can be 
effective. However, in a developing economy, 
such as Peru, a more liberal tax system can spur 
prosperity. 
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The Need for a Liberal Tax Structure 
in a Developing Economy: Chilean 
Tax Reform 
 The Chilean tax reform of the 1990s, 
discussed previously, is a prime example of 
how a liberal tax reform may be necessary for 
a developing economy. Of the $580 million 
increase in taxation revenues, $50 million was 
derived from the restructuring of income tax 
brackets (Boylan). It is important to note that 
this reform did not increase the applicable tax 
rate of any tax bracket; rather, it classified more 
households in the upper-income bracket that 
were previously in a lower bracket. Therefore, 
this part of the reform was considered liberal 
because the additional revenue was derived 
from those in the upper-income sector. The 
increase in the VAT was a reform that generated 
$200 million of additional tax revenue. This was 
neither a liberal nor a conservative reform, as 
the VAT is applied at a flat rate on all taxpayers. 
This was the most politically moderate 
adjustment to the Chilean tax system.
 All in all, the Chilean reform represented 
a shift to a more liberal tax system, as the 
largest amount of new revenues was derived 
from corporations and a considerable portion 
of new revenues was derived from the upper-
income sector. It may be more effective to tax 
corporations as opposed to individuals because 
corporations generally earn higher incomes. 
Furthermore, this type of liberal reform can 
lead to greater social equality.
 Overall, the Chilean tax regime in the 
1990s was socially liberal and helped decrease 
the wealth gap. Corporations and wealthy 
households paid approximately two-thirds of 
the new tax revenues generated by the reform 
(Boylan). Peru might consider implementing 
a similar type of liberal tax reform to both 
increase taxation revenues and social equality. 
For Peru to progress to a transition economy, 
the government needs to generate higher tax 
revenues and then use those funds to increase 
social spending. Increasing social spending will 
also allow the lower classes greater access to 
resources and technology and the opportunity 
to achieve higher levels of education. These will 
in turn increase social equality and decrease the 
wealth gap. 
Peruvian Tax Reform
 My suggestion for tax reform in Peru is to 
implement a more liberal taxation system that 
not only will increase government revenues but 
also be moderate in nature. A moderate reform 
is necessary because making extreme changes 
to Peruvian tax law in a short period of time 
could create unnecessary social tension. 
 Tax evasion in Peru occurs as a result of 
the size and existence of the informal sector. 
However, targeting tax evasion is not the most 
efficient way to increase government revenues. 
While I believe efforts to decrease tax evasion are 
still necessary, they should play only a minimal 
role in increasing government revenues. For 
the most part, wealthier individuals in Peru 
are not evading taxes; rather, they work for 
corporations, which require their employees to 
file tax returns. On the other hand, most of the 
informal sector is made up of the poorest people 
in Peru. Fighting tax evasion will effectively 
Table 2
Socioeconomic Structure of Peru (Percentage of Households)
2004 2014 2021
Higher class (A) <1 2 3 
Consolidated middle class (B) 4 13 16 
Emerging middle class (C) 25 31 36 
Emerging lower class (D) 44 36 31 
Lower-class poor (E) 27 18 14 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2016.
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raise taxes on those with lower incomes, which, 
in turn, will decrease social equality.
 I support President Kuczynski’s proposal 
to increase the corporate income tax from 28 
percent to 30 percent. The 2-percentage-point 
increase is reasonable, because it will effectively 
increase the country’s corporate income tax 
revenue at a rate that is not overly aggressive. 
Also, I believe it is wise to accompany the 
increase in the corporate income tax with a 
decrease in the VAT. Although Kuczynski gives 
as the reason for this reduction encouraging 
more people to register and pay this tax (Post), 
in my opinion the reduction is beneficial 
because this type of tax also disproportionately 
impacts classes D and E, the classes most in 
need of assistance. Not only is this tax reform 
more moderate by increasing one tax while 
decreasing another but also it increases social 
equality by minimizing the societal impact of a 
regressive form of taxation. 
 In addition to Kuczynski’s tax adjustments, 
I would recommend that the Peruvian 
government create an additional tax bracket 
solely for the top 2 percent of households. The 
top 2 percent of Peruvians are the wealthiest 
households in Peru, and these citizens clearly 
have the means to pay additional income tax. I 
suggest that the applicable rate be 39 percent for 
this additional tax bracket. This 9-percentage-
point increase in the tax rate would greatly 
increase government tax revenues as well 
as increase social equality. These additional 
revenues could then be reinvested in social 
spending, which would decrease the wealth gap 
even more.
 In conclusion, tax reform in Peru can play 
an instrumental role in increasing government 
revenues and, in turn, stimulating the social 
sector. When Peruvians in the lower classes 
are provided funds for greater opportunities 
in such areas as education and healthcare, 
the Peruvian economy as a whole will gain 
the required resources to transition from a 
developing economy to a developed economy.
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